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RENTAL AMUSEMENT OPENS THE DOOR FOR LOST

VOLUME SELLERS, BUT DOES NOT FULLY INVITE THEM
IN: AN EXAMINATION OF THE ADOPTION OF THE LOST
VOLUME SELLER DOCTRINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA
I.

INTRODUCTION

In CollinsEntertainmentCorp. v. Coats & CoatsRentalAmusement,' the South

Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the use of the "lost volume seller" doctrine for
calculating damages in a breach of contract case involving the leasing and
placement of gaming machines in a business.2 This is the first time that a South
Carolina court has affirmed the lost volume seller doctrine, which a majority of

courts in the country have adopted,3 and provides a new theory of recovery to

certain sellers in breach of contract cases.
The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of lost
volume recovery in the Collins case.' If affirmed, sellers who are determined lost
volume sellers will be able to recover lost profits from a breached contract without
that award being reduced by a subsequent resale. "Simply defined, a lost volume
seller is one whose supply is, as a practical matter, unlimited in comparison to the
demand for the product."5 A lost volume seller is one who could and would have
performed both the original breached contract and the subsequent contract
regardless of the original breach. 6 Since the seller could have had the benefit of
both the original sale and the resale, an award of lost profits from the original sale

1. 355 S.C. 125,584 S.E.2d 120 (Ct. App. 2003), cert. granted, No. 3596, Shearhouse Adv. Sh.
No. 26 at 6 (S.C. June 10, 2004).
2. Id. at 136-37, 584 S.E.2d at 126-27.
3. See, e.g., R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 924 F.2d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1991)
(applying lost volume seller doctrine to the sale of an MRI machine); Ullman-Briggs, Inc. v. Salton,
Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1003, 1008-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (applying lost volume seller doctrine to sales
representation contract); Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 833 A.2d 891, 898-901 (Conn. 2003) (applying
lost volume seller doctrine to a hospital's employment contract); Unique Designs, Inc. v. Pittard Mach.
Co., 409 S.E.2d 241,243-44 (Ga. CL App. 1991) (applying lost volume seller doctrine to a contract
for the sale of a lathe); Jetz Serv. Co. v. Salina Props., 865 P.2d 1051, 1055-57 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)
(applying lost volume seller doctrine to service providers); Auto Shine Car Wash Sys., Inc., v. Nice 'N
Clean Car Wash, Inc., 792 N.E.2d 682, 686-87 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (applying lost volume seller
doctrine to a contract for the sale of car wash equipment); Harvey v. Timber Res., Inc., 37 S.W.3d 814,
819 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (applying lost volume seller doctrine to timber sales contract); Neri v. Retail
Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311, 313-15 (N.Y. 1972) (applying lost volume seller doctrine to the sale
of a boat).
4. Cert. granted, No. 3596, Shearhouse Adv. Sh. No. 26 at 6 (S.C. June 10, 2004).
5. Daniel W. Matthews, Comment, Should the Doctrineof Lost Volume Seller Be Retained? A
Response to ProfessorBreen, 51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1195, 1196 (1997).
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: AVOIDABLUTY AS ALIMITATION ON DAMAGES
§ 350 cmt. d (1981).
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is necessary to put the seller in as good a position in which it would have been had
the original contract been performed.
Although the court of appeals' decision brings South Carolina courts within the
vast majority ofjurisdictions recognizing lost volume recovery, Collinsleaves many
questions unanswered about the lost volume seller doctrine, especially how South
Carolina courts are to apply it.' The South Carolina Supreme Court has the ability
to answer these questions. This Note provides an in depth analysis of the lost
volume seller doctrine in general and how it should be applied in South Carolina.
Part II of this Note discusses the lost volume theory of recovery in detail, examining
arguments supporting and opposing the doctrine, and examining why the arguments
opposing the doctrine fail. Part III examines how other courts have applied the
doctrine and the different tests those courts have created to determine if a seller is
a lost volume seller. Part IV examines what the current Collins rule means for
breach of contract cases in South Carolina. Part V suggests that the South Carolina
Supreme Court should affirm the adoption of lost volume recovery in South
Carolina and apply a two part test that asks (1) whether a seller has the ability to
enter into an additional transaction and (2) whether the seller would have entered
into an additional transaction irrespective of the buyer's breach.
II. LOST VOLUME SELLER DOCTRINE
A.

The Doctrine

In its simplest form, the normal goal of contract damages is to put the nonbreaching party in as good a position in which it would have been had the contract
been fully performed.9 This method of calculating damages attempts to give the
non-breaching party the benefit of its bargain, which is generally the difference
between the non-breaching party's position after the breach and the positions that
would have been had the contract been fully performed.' ° The Uniform
Commercial Code [hereinafter U.C.C.] section 2-708 governs this calculation for
contracts involving the sale of goods." The measure of damages is "the difference
between the market price at the time and place for tender and the unpaid contract
price together with any incidental damages . .. , but less expenses saved in
consequence of the buyer's breach."' 2
This calculation may be the normal method of calculating breach of contract
damages, but it is not the only method. Under U.C.C. section 2-708(2), "[i]f the
measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the seller in as

7. Id.
8. See supra PartIV.
9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: MEASURE OF DAMAGES INGENERAL § 347 cmt.

a (1981).
10. Id. § 347.
11. U.C.C. § 2-708 (1998). When the transaction involves a lease instead of a sale, the nonbreaching party is referred to as a lost volume lessor, and U.C.C. section 2A-528(2) governs the lost
profit award. Id. § 2A-528(2) (2001). The same principles apply to lost volume lessors and lost
volume sellers.

12. U.C.C. § 2-708(1) (1998). Codified at South Carolina Code section 36-2-708 (West 2004).
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good a position as performance would have done then the measure of damages is
the profit... which the seller would have made from full performance by the
buyer,.".
.. , It is this language, also expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, section 347, comment f, that gives rise to the lost volume seller
doctrine.' 4
To understand the way in which lost volume recovery departs from normal
contract damages, it is helpful to understand the principle of mitigation. Under
normal contract law, following a breach, the non-breaching party is required to act
in such a way as to minimize its losses.' 5 In South Carolina, "[a] party injured by
the acts of another is required to do those things a person of ordinary prudence
would do under the circumstances to mitigate damages .... "' This is not an
absolute duty; it "does not require unreasonable exertion or substantial
expense. .

. .""

For a non-breaching seller, this would require the seller to act

reasonably after the buyer's breach to enter into a substitute contract or otherwise
lessen its losses.' 8
The lost volume seller is unable to minimize its losses by entering into a
substitute transaction. The lost volume seller could have had the benefit of both the
original broken contract and the additional contract. 9 Thus, a requirement that a
lost volume seller's damages be reduced by the cost of a subsequent resale will not
put the seller in the same position as performance of the original contract.20 The
lost volume seller is in such a position that any resale would be in addition to, not
instead of, the original sale.2 For this reason, a seller who is determined to be a lost
volume seller is entitled to the profits from the original breached contract, regardless
of whether it has entered into a subsequent transaction. 22
A classic example of an application of the lost volume seller doctrine is found
in Neri v. Retail Marine Corp." The plaintiff contracted to buy a boat from the
defendant for $12,587.40.2" The plaintiff paid the defendant a $4,250 deposit, but
then breached the contract and refused to make the remaining payments.25 The

13. U.C.C. § 2-708(2).
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: MEASURE OF DAMAGES INGENERAL § 347, cmt.

f(1981). Comment f states: "[i]f the injured party could and would have entered into the subsequent
contract, even if the contract had not been broken, and could have had the benefit of both, he can be
said to have 'lost volume' and the subsequent transaction is not a substitute for the broken contract."
15. See id. § 350.
16. Genovese v. Bergeron, 327 S.C. 567, 572, 490 S.E.2d 608, 611 (Ct. App. 1997).

17. Id.
18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: AVOIDABILITY AS A LIMITATION ON DAMAGES

§ 350 cmt. c (1981).
19. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
20. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS:
§ 350 cmt. d (1981).
23. 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972).

AVOIDABILITY AS A LIMITATION ON DAMAGES

24. Id. at 312.

25. Id.
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plaintiff sued for the recovery of his deposit, and the defendant eventually resold the
boat to a third party for the same price that the plaintiff agreed to pay.26
In awarding lost profits to the defendant, the court distinguished between the
loss of a sale for an individual selling his personal automobile and an automotive
dealer who has an inventory of automobiles, when, the contract for the original sale
is breached and the item is later resold.2' The court's illustration is a classic
example of why lost volume recovery is sometimes necessary to give the seller the
benefit of its bargain:
[I]f a private party agrees to sell his automobile to a buyer for
$2,000, a breach by the buyer would cause the seller no loss
(except incidental damages, i. e. [sic] expense of a new sale) if the
seller was able to sell the automobile to another buyer for $2000
[sic]. But the situation is different with dealers having an
unlimited supply of standard-priced goods.
Thus, if an
automobile dealer agrees to sell a car to a buyer at the standard
price of $2000 [sic], a breach by the buyer injures the dealer, even
though he is able to sell the automobile to another for $2000 [sic].
If the dealer has an inexhaustible supply of cars, the resale to
replace the breaching buyer costs the dealer a sale, because, had
the breaching buyer 2performed,
the dealer would have made two
8
sales instead of one.
In situations in which a seller has an unlimited supply of goods in relation to
demand, an award of lost profits is justified. If the buyer in the illustration did not
breach the contract, the dealer was capable of performing both the original sale and
the additional sale to the third party.29 Since both sales would have been made
regardless of the original buyer's breach, an award of lost profits is needed to put
the seller in the position it would have been had the original buyer not breached.
Although a majority of American courts have accepted the lost volume seller
doctrine,3 ° at least one jurisdiction has expressly rejected the theory. The reasoning
this court used in rejecting the theory of lost volume recovery will illustrate the
weaknesses in the arguments opposing lost volume recovery and help illustrate why
lost volume recovery is the proper measure of damages in certain situations.
B. Northeastern Vending Co. v. P.D.O., Inc.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the lost volume seller doctrine in
Northeastern Vending Co. v. P.D.O., Inc.3 "on a number of grounds, but principally
because of a perceived negative effect on the seller's duty to mitigate.32

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id. at 314.
Id.
Nedi v. Retail Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311,314 (N.Y. 1972).
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
606 A.2d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
Id. at 938.
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Northeastern placed cigarette and amusement machines in P.D.O.'s place of

business pursuant to a lease agreement similar to that in Collins.33 P.D.O. breached

the agreement and removed Northeastern's machines.34 After the breach,
Northeastern did not retrieve its machines for nearly seven months,35 and then
"stored the machines in its warehouse where it maintain[ed] several hundred other
machines."36
The court declined to apply the lost volume seller doctrine because it "would
encourage the non-breaching party to do nothing to minimize its damages" and
because the lost volume seller doctrine "conflicts with the purpose behind awarding
contract damages."3 7 It appears that the court may have been troubled that
Northeastern did not retrieve its machines in a timely manner.33
The Northeastern court stated that the lost volume seller doctrine erodes the
seller's duty to mitigate.39 Contrary to this claim, "[t]he lost volume seller, by
definition, does not remain idle. Rather, in order to make a lost volume claim, the
seller must actively pursue a second contract." ° The lost volume seller, after the
other party's breach, will, in the ordinary course of business, seek other contracts.41
In the case of Northeastern's actions following the breach, while it did not retrieve
the exact machines that P.D.O. removed from its premises, it did maintain a
warehouse of several hundred other machines.42 The fate of the exact machines
removed from P.D.Q's place of business was not necessary to a lost volume
recovery determination.43 The issue the court should be concerned with is whether,
through its normal course of business or other means, Northeastern sought
additional contracts.' IfNortheastern did carry on its business in a normal manner,
and entered into an additional contract, that contract would be in addition to, not
instead of, the original contract with P.D.O.45 Further, even if Northeastern did not
enter into a subsequent transaction, but did seek out other transactions, it would be
entitled to lost profits as well.'6 Since Northeastern maintained an inventory of
several hundred other machines, it easily could have, in the normal course of
business, leased any of the other machines regardless of the original contract's
breach.

33. Id. at 937.
34. Id. at 937-38.
35. Id. at 939.

36. Id. at 937-38.
37. Northeastern Vending Co. v. P.D.O., Inc., 606 A.2d 936, 938 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
38. Id. at 939.
39. Id. at 938.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Matthews, supranote 5,at 1214.
Matthews, supranote 5, at 1214.
Northeastern,606 A.2d at 937-38.
See R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc., 924 F.2d 709, 711-12 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating

in dicta that a lost volume seller was not required to prove which later buyer purchased the exact goods
that were the subject of the original contract if the goods were interchangeable).
44. Matthews, supranote 5, at 1214.
45. Matthews, supranote 5, at 1214.
46. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
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The court stated that Northeastern failed to fulfill its duty to mitigate its
damages. 7 What could Northeastern have done to minimize its damages?" The
court admits that Northeastern maintained a warehouse full of other machines. 9 If,
after P.D.O.'s breach, Northeastern entered into a similar leasing arrangement with
another business, this would not reduce Northeastern's damages because it would
have been entirely possible, and presumably simple, to fulfill both the original
breached contract and the additional contract.
C. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda
In Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda,50 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Maine faced a situation in which a lost volume seller was not entitled to a lost
profits award. The plaintiff, a mobile home dealer, contracted to sell a mobile home
to the defendant." After the defendant breached the contract, the defendant's father
offered to purchase the mobile home in his son's place. 2 The plaintiff rejected the
offer and later resold the mobile home to a third party. 3
The court stated that since Maine had not yet considered the validity of lost
volume recovery, the plaintiff has a general duty "to take reasonable steps to
mitigate [its] damages." ' 4 The court further clarified that there was "no evidence
in the record that the Plaintiff's failure to sell to its customer's father rested on any
legitimate ground.""5 Therefore, "it cannot now be heard to complain that its sale
to a third party resulted in lost profits. 56
This case presents a unique situation. The third party attempted to purchase the
goods only because of the original buyer's breach. The defendant's father was not
57
in the market to purchase a mobile home and only offered to do so to aid his son.
Therefore, this is a situation in which the seller could have made the additional sale,
but not without the buyer's breach because the resale buyer would not have been
available.

47. Northeastern,606 A.2d at 939.
48. One thing the Northeastern court failed to address in its criticism of the lost volume seller
doctrine is that the duty to mitigate normally only requires the non-breaching party to act reasonably
following a breach to minimize its losses. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. The lost
volume seller doctrine does not necessarily erode this duty, since it generally requires sellers to have
the capacity to enter into additional contracts and the intent to take on additional contracts. In essence,
since lost volume sellers are generally retail sellers, not private individuals, in the course of their day
to day business they will act reasonably. If the seller normally gets new business through customer
referrals or advertising, then staying open for business or continuing to advertise should fulfill any
general duty to mitigate, regardless of whether the lost volume seller doctrine applies.
49. Northeastern,606 A.2d at 939.
50. 463 A.2d 722 (Me. 1983).
51. Id. at 723.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 724.
55. Id. at 725.
56. Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda, 463 A.2d 722,726 (Me. 1983).
57. See id. at 724.
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TESTS COURTS USE TO DETERMINE IF A SELLER IS A LOST VOLUME SELLER

As noted before, the vast majority ofjurisdictions have adopted the lost volume
seller doctrine in some fashion. 58 From this overwhelming acceptance, a few
different applications of the lost volume seller doctrine have been adopted.
A. Ullman-Briggs: Two-PartTest
The court in Ullman-Briggs,Inc. v. Salton, Inc. 9 developed a widely-used test
to determine if a seller is a lost volume seller. Ullman-Briggs was a manufacturer's
representative company that solicited orders from merchants to sell their products.6'
Salton manufactured and distributed small electrical appliances." Ullman-Briggs
contracted to be Salton's exclusive distributor to J.C. Penney.62
Following Salton's breach of the distributorship contract, Ullman-Briggs sued
and argued that it should receive lost profits under the lost volume seller doctrine.6 3
The court stated that for a seller to be a lost volume seller, it must "demonstrate that
it had the subjective intent to take on [additional contracts]" and "as an objective
component, [a seller] must also establish that it had the capacity to take on extra
[contracts]." 64 This two-part test was not satisfied because Ullman-Briggs admitted
that it "would not have had the subjective intent to take on [extra contracts] if Salton
'
had not terminated the contract. ' 65
This two-part test was used in Lone StarFord,Inc. v. McCormick.66 Lone Star,
the defendant appellant, employed Drury as an advertising spokesperson.6 7 While
the defendant employed Drury, he secured an additional job and secured further
employment after the defendant breached the contract.6 8
The court noted that the contract was "a nonexclusive, personal services
contract.. ." and did not require the plaintiff to "devote his time during normal
business hours on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis ...."69 With respect to Lone
Star's argument that Drury was required to mitigate his damages, the court stated
that "[t]he mere fact that an injured party is able to make arrangements for
disposition of the services that he was to supply under a contract does not
necessarily mean that, in doing so, he will avoid loss. 70
To determine if Drury was a lost volume seller, the court applied the UllmanBriggs two-part test,7' and held that Drury satisfied the test because he "was

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See supranote 3.
754 F. Supp. 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Id. at 1004.
Id.
See id. at 1005.
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1008-09.
Ullman-Briggs, Inc. v. Salton, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
838 S.W.2d 734 (Tex. App. 1992).
Id. at 737.
Id. at 740.
Id.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. d (1981)).
See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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engaged in similar contractual work at the time he executed the agreement with [the
defendant], and he entered into an additional contract during the term of the
agreement and before the breach by [the defendant]." 72
Although not mentioning it expressly, the Ullman-Briggscourt appears to draw
heavily from comment f of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 347,
which states that "[i]f the injured party could and would have entered into the
subsequent contract, even if the [first] contract had not been broken, and could have
had the benefit of both, . .

."

then the seller is a lost volume seller.7 3 The

Restatement requires the same objective and subjective proof that the UllmanBriggs court requires. According to the Restatement, a seller could have entered
into the subsequent contract if it had the objective capacity to fulfill both the
original contract and the subsequent contract. "' Further, the seller would have
entered into the subsequent contract if it had the subjective intent to enter into
another contract regardless of the original contract's breach.75
B. Diasonics: Three-PartTest
One of the more frequent tests courts use to determine if a seller is a lost
volume seller originated in R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Diasonics, Inc.
[hereinafterDiasonicsJ].76 Davis contracted with Diasonics to purchase a medical
diagnostic machine.77 After making a $300,000 downpayment, Davis breached the
same price, and
contract. 7' Diasonics then sold the machine
79 to a third party for the
Davis sued to recover its down payment.
The court in DiasonicsI held, for the first time in Illinois, that a seller could
recoup lost profits if it was a lost volume seller."0 Although the court adopted the

lost volume seller doctrine, it did not specifically adopt the Ullman-Briggs test.
Instead of focusing on the seller's capacity to make an additional sale, the court
stated that "the relevant questions include, not only whether the seller could have
produced the breached units in addition to its actual volume, but also whether it
would have been profitable for the seller to produce both units."'"
The court adopted a three-part requirement that a seller prove "(1) that it
possessed the capacity to make an additional sale, (2) that it would have been
profitable for it to make an additional sale, and (3) that it probably would have made

72. Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 740 (Tex. App. 1992).
73. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: MEASURE OF DAMAGES INGENERAL § 347 cmt. f
(1981).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. 826 F.2d 678,681 (7th Cir. 1987) (adopting for the first time in Illinois the rule that a lost
volume seller is entitled to recoup its lost profts) [hereinafter Diasonics1]; R.E. Davis Chem. Corp. v.
Diasonics, Inc., 924 F.2d 709 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that Diasonics is a lost volume seller, but
remanding for further damages calculations) [hereinafter DiasonicsI1].
77. DiasonicsI, 826 F.2d at 679.
78. Id. at 680.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 681.
81. Id. at 684.
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an additional sale absent the buyer's breach. ' 12 This test requires an objective
showing that the seller could have made an additional sale, a subjective showing
that the seller probably would have made an additional sale, and a showing that the
additional sale would have been profitable. Thus, this test incorporates a
profitability requirement to the two-part test in Ullman-Briggs.
The DiasonicsI court adopted the lost volume seller doctrine for the first time
under Illinois law after devoting much analysis to the lost volume seller theory of
recovery, and the Diasonics I court then applied the new test to the facts of the
case." The Diasonics II court stated that Diasonics satisfied the first prong of the
test because "[tihe evidence [was] undisputed that Diasonics possessed the capacity
to manufacture one more MRI." The subjective part of the test was satisfied by
showing that Diasonics was "'beating the bushes for all possible sales"' 85 and
pursuing "every possible lead." 6 Oddly enough, after developing a new three-part
test for determining if a seller is a lost volume seller, the DiasonicsII court did not
devote any discussion to whether the resale would have been profitable.8
Therefore, the Diasonicsthree-part test for determining if a seller is a lost volume
seller can be satisfied by a showing that the seller had the objective capacity to enter
into an additional sale, that the additional sale was for the same price as the original
sale, and that the seller actively sought out an additional sale. 8
The Diasonics II court ruled on another issue that sometimes arises in lost
volume seller cases: whether the seller has to resell the exact goods the buyer
contracted to buy. 89 In DiasonicsII, the court stated that "the generic MRI units
manufactured by Diasonics were interchangeable and thus were not identified to
any particular customer until just prior to delivery."9' Therefore, since the goods
were interchangeable, Diasonics was not required to prove to which specific buyer
it later resold the goods. 9' Instead, upon showing that Diasonics fell within the
three-part test, the court determined it was a lost volume seller regardless ofwhether
it could point to a specific buyer who purchased the specific MRI machine from the
breached sale.'
The Kansas Court of Appeals adopted the Diasonics test in Rodriguez v.
Learjet, Inc.93 Rodriguez contracted with Learjet to buy an airplane and paid a
$250,000 deposit.' Rodriguez breached the contract and refused to make further

82. DiasonicsII, 924 F.2d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing DiasonicsI, 826 F.2d 678, 685 (7th
Cir. 1987)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting the trial record).
86. Id.
87. While Diasonics1I does not discuss this prong of the test, the DiasonicsI court stated that
Diasonics later resold a unit for the original contract price. DiasonicsI, 826 F.2d at 680.
88. The third prong to the Diasonicstest is subjective and therefore dependent on the seller's
intention to resell, not on any market demand for the goods. See supranote 65 and accompanying text.
89. Diasonics II, 924 F.2d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1991).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 712.
92. See id. at 711-12.
93. 946 P.2d 1010 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
94. Id. at 1012.
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payments.9" Learjet retained the deposit pursuant to a liquidated damages clause
and entered into a subsequent contract to sell the plane to a third party.9 6 Rodriguez
argued that the subsequent sale should be treated as a substitute transaction and the
profits from the resale should reduce the damages.97 The Rodriguez court, citing
DiasonicsHI, applied the three-pronged test requiring the seller to prove it had the
capacity to enter into a subsequent transaction, the subsequent transaction would
have been profitable, and the seller probably would have made the additional sale
absent the buyer's breach.98
The Rodriguez court's analysis under the three-part test is also incomplete.
Under the first prong of the test, the court stated that "Learjet was operating at 60
percent capacity during the relevant time period and that Learjet was able to
accelerate its production schedule to produce more of the model 60 planes in any
Under the profitability prong of the test, the court stated that
given year."
"Learjet also presented testimony about its accounting system which indicated that
an additional sale would have been profitable to Learjet" and that the additional sale
was priced similarly to the original. " Although the Rodriguez court discussed the
profitability prong of the test, it never discussed the third prong requiring that the
seller would have entered into the additional contract absent the buyer's breach. °
The Connecticut Supreme Court also expressly adopted the Diasonics threepronged test in Gianettiv. Norwalk Hospital' and applied it to a services contract.
The plaintiff, a plastic surgeon, was granted full clinical privileges as a staff
physician, a contract position renewable on an annual basis at the defendant
hospital.'0 3 He had similar privileges at other area hospitals.'" After his privileges
at the defendant hospital were not renewed, plaintiff increased his practice at other
hospitals.'0 5 The plaintiff argued that he was a lost volume seller and the income
services provided to other hospitals should not mitigate his
from subsequent
0
damages.1
Although the court adopted the Diasonicsthree-part test, it held that the record
did not contain enough evidence to determine if the plaintiff possessed the capacity
to enter into additional employment contracts with other hospitals.107 The court also
held the evidence was insufficient to determine if the plaintiff would have entered
into additional contracts with other hospitals regardless of the defendant's denial of

95. Id.
96. Id. at 1012-13.
97. See id. at 1014.
98. Id. at 1015 (citingDiasonicsII, 924 F.2d 709, 711 (7th Cir. 1991)).

99. Rodriguez v.Learjet, Inc., 946 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
100. Id.
101. It is possible that, in its analysis of Learet's objective ability to manufacture more jets, the
court meant to satisfy the subjective requirement as well, but this begs the question: Why have two
different prongs of a test if they require only one analysis?
102. 833 A.2d 891 (Conn. 2003).
103. Id. at 894-95.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 902.
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his privileges.0 8 Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial court without
discussing the profitability portion of the test.' °9
IV. LOST VOLUME SELLER

DOCTRINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA FOLLOWING COLLINS

The South Carolina Court of Appeals relied on C.I. C. Corp.v. Ragtime, Inc.'"o
in its Collins decision. The facts of the two cases are similar. Each case involved
a plaintiff who owned gaming and amusement machines it leased to business
owners, who would place the machines in their businesses, with the two sharing the
profits the machines produced."
In Collins, the court of appeals did not extensively analyze the lost volume
seller doctrine. The court cited only two foreign cases and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts to support the doctrine."' The Collins court ostensibly
adopted the New Jersey Appellate Division's reasoning in C.LC. Corp."3
In C.I.C. Corp., the plaintiffowned a warehouse full ofcoin operated machines,
four of which it leased to the defendant." 4 After the defendant breached the
contract by removing the machines, the plaintiff recovered the machines and stored
them in its warehouse, where they would be released to another customer in the
ordinary course of business. " Upon finding that the "plaintiffhad a warehouse full
of a variety of coin-operated machines and could have placed as many as it could
have found customers for," the court held that plaintiff was a lost volume seller and
was under no duty to mitigate." 6
The Collins court, following this reasoning, held that "once Collins showed it
had sufficient inventory 'to place as many [machines] as it could have found
customers for,' it likewise established that any other deals it would have ' made
7
would have been in addition to, rather than instead of, the prior agreement." "
The courts in both CI.C. Corp. and Collins determined a seller was a lost
volume seller upon a showing that it possessed a warehouse of machines and that
the seller could have "placed as many as it could have found customers for.""'
Other courts that have confronted similar situations involving the leasing of profit
producing machines have used similar means to determine if a seller is a lost
volume seller.
In Jetz Service Co. v. Salina Properties, 9 the court had to determine if the
plaintiff, who was "in the business of supplying coin-operated laundry equipment,"

108. Gianetti v. Norwalk Hosp., 833 A.2d 891, 902-03 (Conn. 2003).
109. Id. at903 n.10.
110. 726 A.2d 316 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
111. Collins Entm't Corp. v. Coats & Coats Rental Amusement, 355 S.C. 125, 130, 584 S.E.2d
120, 123 (Ct. App. 2003); C..C. Corp., 726 A.2d at 317.
112. See Collins, 355 S.C. at 137 n.13, 584 S.E.2d at 126 n.13.
113. See id.
114. See C.I.C. Corp., 726 A.2d at 317.
115. Id. at 317-18.
116. Id. at 320-21.
117. Collins, 355 S.C. at 137, 584 S.E.2d at 127 (quoting C.I.C Corp., 726 A.2d at 320)

(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
118. Id.; C.I.C. Corp. v. Ragtime, Inc., 726 A.2d 316, 320 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
119. 865 P.2d 1051 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
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was "a 'lost volume lessee.""... 0 Jetz contracted with Salina Properties for the
placement of five washer-dryer units' 2 ' After Salina breached the contract, Jetz
retrieved its washer-dryer units and placed them in its warehouse, along with the
rest of its inventory of washer-dryer units.

22

The court found that Jetz had "several

warehouses in which it [had] available for lease about 1,500 used washers and
dryers; [and] continually look[ed] for new locations in which to install laundry
equipment.... ."" Under these circumstances, the court held that Jetz was in fact
a lost volume lessee and did not have a duty to mitigate its losses.' 24
Like the Collins and C.I.C. Corp. courts, the Jetz court found a seller in the
business of leasing coin-operated machines was a lost volume seller when the seller
had a large inventory of machines on hand and continually sought out new
customers. 2 While none of these courts expressly stated it, they appear to be
following a two-part, subjective and objective requirement test similar to the one
used in Ullman-Briggs and Lone Star Ford. Since the sellers maintained
warehouses where they stored numerous machines, they had the objective capacity
to enter into additional contracts regardless of the original contract's breach. The
sellers also continuously looked for new customers in the normal course of
business. Thus, they satisfied the subjective intent to enter into additional contracts.
The South Carolina Supreme Court should affirn the holding in Collinsthat the
lost volume seller doctrine is a valid form of recovery in certain circumstances.
More specifically, the supreme court should also clarify exactly what type of test
South Carolina courts should adopt to determine if individual sellers are in fact lost
volume sellers entitled to lost profits awards. The two part objective-subjective test
that other courts use, and which appears to have its roots in the comments to the
Restatement, is a satisfactory determinant of what qualifies a seller as a lost volume
seller.' 26
This two-part test is incorporated into the three-part Diasonicstest, which also
includes a profitability requirement. 27
' The DiasonicsI court, when developing its
three-part test, did not devote extensive time explaining the necessity of a
profitability requirement and only cited one law review article.' 28 In light of this
limited analysis and the court's less than thorough application of the profitability
element, 29 the South Carolina Supreme Court should reject adding profitability as
a requirement to proving lost volume seller status. The Diasonics courts did not
supply an adequate justification for its necessity and further, did not explain how
courts are to apply it. 3

120. Id. at 1057.
121. Id. at 1053.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1057.
124. Id.
125. Jetz Serv. Co. v. Salina Properties, 865 P.2d 1051, 1057 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993).
126. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
127. See supra Part III.B.
128. Diasonics1, 826 F.2d 687, 684 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing Goetz & Scott, Measuring Seller's
Damages: The Lost ProfitsPuzzle, 31 STAN. L. REv. 323 (1979)).
129. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
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In DiasonicsII, the profitability requirement was satisfied because the resale
price was the same as the original contract price, but that arguably does not indicate
whether a seller is a lost volume seller. 3 ' If a car dealer enters into a contract with
a buyer for the purchase of an automobile for the sticker price of $20,000 and the
buyer later breaches, why would that same seller not be a lost volume seller if it
later resold the automobile for $19,000? The car dealer would have the capacity to
make the additional sale if it had other similar cars available and would likely have
the subjective intent to make an additional sale. What if the resale price, while still
being lower, gives the dealer a profit nonetheless? The Diasonics court did not
answer these questions, nor did it supply an adequate justification for the need of
a profitability requirement.'32
Status as a lost volume seller is based on the seller's inability to mitigate losses
through post breach conduct and has nothing to do with whether an additional sale
would have been profitable. South Carolina courts should look to whether a seller
had the ability to enter into an additional sale and whether that seller would have
entered into another sale irrespective of the buyer's breach. Moreover, court
determination of whether a specific additional sale would have been profitable
could make application of the lost volume seller doctrine overly complicated and
difficult. Usually, the determination of whether a seller is a lost volume seller is not
difficult to make.'33
Most retail sellers will have sufficient inventory or supply to easily satisfy the
first prong of this test, and a court could easily presume that a seller would want to
enter into an additional transaction. It is unlikely that a retailer in the business of
selling a particular good would not want to enter into another transaction if it
possessed the inventory or the supply to do so. Therefore, in most cases,
determining a seller is a lost volume seller should not be difficult; but, if
profitability were added as an element, application of the doctrine would be
markedly different. Courts then would have to devise a test for measuring
profitability and receive evidence from each side to prove that the additional sale
was profitable.
At most, a court should be concerned with whether the additional sale was
economically rational. If it was rational for the seller to enter into the additional
contract, it should not matter if it was profitable or not.
V.

CONCLUSION

The South Carolina Supreme Court should affirm the Collinsdecision, thereby
bringing South Carolina within the vast majority of jurisdictions that have adopted
the lost volume seller doctrine. The court should also clarify the manner in which
South Carolina courts are to apply the lost volume seller doctrine. The two-part test
from Ullman-Briggs,used by the court in Lone Star Fordand in effect used by the
courts in Jetz Services and C.L C. Corp., adequately addresses the issue of whether

131. See supranote 88 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
133. As noted, supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text, it takes a very unusual situation,
similar to what the court faced in Schiavi Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Gironda,463 A.2d 722 (Me. 1983),
for a seller to lose its status as a lost volume seller.
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a particular seller is a lost volume seller. The objective component will determine
whether the seller had the capacity to enter into an additional sale, while the
subjective component will determine whether the seller would have entered into the
sale regardless of the buyer's breach. If these two requirements are satisfied, then
a seller will be entitled to lost profits to put it in as good a position as it would have
been in if the buyer had not breached.
Profitability should not be used as an element in this determination because it
would make the test more difficult to apply and does not have any bearing on
whether a seller is a lost volume seller. The correct line of inquiry should determine
whether it would have been possible for the seller to mitigate its losses through post
sale conduct. The South Carolina Supreme Court should adopt this two-part test.
W Hugh McAngus, Jr.
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